
Experienced U.S. Practitioners: Step Up and Fix Your Fields!
Bill Harrington shows how one can successfully shut-down bad actors and effect policy change that benefits the financial sectors and society.
Photo credit: Lucas Jackson, Rueters
February 2026 | Written by Bill Harrington
Since 2010, I have striven to repair the U.S. by independently working to make my field of finance work better for everyone’s benefit rather than primarily for insiders. My field of finance? The overly complex but hollow finance that imploded in 2008 and wiped-out investors worldwide, wrecked the U.S. and other developed economies, and corroded the U.S. social compact.
I know a handful of other U.S. finance practitioners who are doing the same. Why do we bother? Because finance-for-a-few relentlessly harms everyone else by continuously warping economic processes and also by periodically crashing the whole economy. And because failure to fix what demonstrably does not work sets a perverse precedent that spurs practitioners to operate on an expanded scale of harm, exponentially amplifying the injury to society.
Two sections further below describe and link to key examples of my reparative work, which I will continue for as long as I am able. Similarly experienced U.S. practitioners in every field must start doing the same, namely repair the U.S. by making their respective fields work better for everyone’s benefit. The time is now. The need is acute. Every person in the U.S. deserves systems — financial, legal, medical, and governmental, to name the most obvious — that serve everyone equally well.
Working independently to fix my field has been both personally satisfying and very, very costly. An experienced U.S. practitioner in any field must expect the same, namely, to bear a high cost but reap immense satisfaction. By definition, working independently against an entrenched system entails being largely if not entirely self-reliant, i.e., to work with at best a handful of colleagues, little-to-no compensation, and lots of setbacks. Many practitioners who might want to fix their field cannot accept such terms, but some can and my work shows that even one experienced person can make their field work better for everyone. Hence this call for experienced U.S. practitioners to act now!
I am proud that I walked straight out the door of my then employer Moody’s Ratings (Moody’s) in July 2010 with complete freedom to critique the company and its handiwork. Preserving my freedom of speech post-resignation was the plan because I fully intended to publicly continue the best-practice work that I had done from my first day at Moody’s to my last.
And I have succeeded beyond my wildest expectations. Most satisfyingly, I have perfected my life’s work by continually producing and disseminating unimpeachable, public-sphere critiques and remedies for problematic finance. Moreover, in so doing I have forged a path to aid any conscientious U.S practitioner similarly willing and able to work independently to fix their field to effect beneficial change for everyone in the U.S. and the country as a whole. The path would be much tougher to clear from scratch today.
The specifics of my repair job? I successfully advocated that U.S. financial regulators compel complex-finance practitioners to stop producing a noxious type of deal that was a prime culprit in 2008 calamities, namely a securitization with a “flip-clause-swap-contract.“
How did I help? In two, multi-year steps.
First, I publicly helped U.S. regulators deactivate the core component of the noxious deal template in 2015 by providing conclusive, plain-spoken evidence of the component’s glaring deficiencies. The component — the “flip-clause-swap-contract” — is a dirty/open secret that sparked and amplified 2008 crises by felling both parties to every failed contract. Many contracts did fail, vastly more would have failed but for bailouts, and quite justly, the two types of contracting parties became infamous. On one side, a financial institution such as Lehman Brothers provided a given contract. On the other side, a securitization of bonds (collateralized debt obligation or CDO), residential mortgages (residential mortgage-backed securities or RMBS), or both (CDO of RMBS) was the contract end-user.
Second, I’ve helped to preserve the 2015 regulatory action that deactivates the flip-clause-swap-contract by conducting single-handed pushback against industry lobbying for contract revival, an ongoing effort that has both domestic and international prongs. In the U.S., practitioners elide contract harms to periodically urge contract revival under the guise of advancing public policy by improving loan affordability. Outside the U.S., and deeply unfortunately for their respective nations, reckless policymakers in Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK incentivize dealmakers to use the very same noxious template — flip-clause-swap-contract and all — in a misguided effort to jumpstart economic growth.
Taking the poisonous deal template off the U.S. table has obligated complex-finance practitioners to construct better securitizations — most notably, better RMBS. From the get-go, each deal sans flip-clause-swap-contract rewards investors more fully and strengthens rather than saps the U.S. economy and social compact. Collectively, more robust deals fund more useful projects, make the U.S. economy more productive, and create more opportunities for more people. Complex finance practitioners still exploit other demonstrably deficient templates that penalize investors and stymy the U.S. economy and individuals — templates that Moody’s and its credit rating “competitors” collectively concoct and peddle. Even so, investors, everyone else, and the U.S. economy are all better off than if complex-finance practitioners had also churned out more RMBS and other securitizations with flip-clause-swap-contracts from 2008 onwards.
Today, conscientious practitioners in a wide swathe of U.S. fields face the same emergency that I faced at Moody’s. In short: How to repair injurious standards in hostile environments that often originate in the workplace? My response based on 20-and-counting years of lived experience: Emergency conditions require emergency solutions! Take action and do reparative work in your current position if and while your employer allows, then when that is no longer possible, resign and publicly continue reparative work — on your own dime if necessary. Had more U.S. finance practitioners joined the handful that includes a few others and me in doing exactly that, both the U.S. economy and the U.S. social compact would be stronger today.
Right now, more conscientious U.S. practitioners must follow the lead of their peers who have already resigned and started to publicly repair their respective fields and the U.S. In addition to conscientious practitioners in financial fields such as crypto, private equity, and private credit, exactly which other conscientious practitioners should emulate those who have already resigned? For a start, attorneys who remain at prominent law firms that chose to settle with the Administration rather than maintain their independence. Also, attorneys who remain at the Justice Department that is requiring prosecutors to pursue partisan aims rather than justice. Likewise, medical practitioners and scientists whose employers either hawk deadly quackery or shirk their obligation to publicly rebut lethal charlatans. And practitioners in every field that voluntarily co-opts itself to serve either insiders or powerful external actors.
Public reparative work is both highly effective and shrewd. Most fundamentally, public reparative work invites scrutiny, and all work benefits from feedback that pinpoints strengths and weaknesses alike. Moreover, public advocacy reaches the widest possible universe of stakeholders, including previously unknown potential allies, disinterested people with objective views, and practitioners in public policy, industry, academia, and all media who build informed awareness. Crucially, public advocacy work exponentially activates the whole range of target audiences in myriad ways that a practitioner might not even envisage and certainly could not achieve solely by personal approaches.
Equally useful, public reparative work flushes out opponents, both those with valid points to address and others with invalid points to debunk. Going public also spotlights very powerful adversaries whose “No comment” says it all. By contrast, speaking out says volumes by demonstrating best faith commitment to serving the common good and by activating the transformative concept of shame in those who refuse to stand up for the common good. Shame is potent, if often maddeningly slow acting. Indeed, even those who explicitly reject shame can inadvertently reveal susceptibility by dismissing the concept too emphatically.
In contrast, maneuvering behind-the-scenes for even the worthiest goal might succeed narrowly but can ultimately self-defeat by implicitly endorsing the self-serving power brokers who perpetuate harmful practice in the first place. Likewise, formal whistleblowing — which generally entails privately approaching enforcement entities via an attorney, ceding agency to them, and remaining otherwise anonymous — can stop a specific injury but is unlikely to help repair a field or stanch systematic pathologies. True, enforcement entities can deploy significant resources to an immediate goal of harm cessation. But enforcement entities dole out information stingily rather than share it widely, and therefore cannot help to identify related injuries, develop best-practice remedies, enlist allies from the widest possible universe, or build consensus to implement remedies.
An experienced U.S. practitioner in any field knows acutely what practices cause harm, which remedies to avail, and who can help or hinder. Likewise, an experienced practitioner knows both the power of the public sphere and at least some tools to deploy there. After all, employers, industry groups, and lobbyists use the same public tools every day to burnish status, advance agendas, and rebut critique.
Regarding the last point, many, if not most, experienced practitioners have witnessed at least one instance of an employer or other entity swiftly mobilizing “crisis management” tools to publicly deflect, deny, and denigrate external criticism. By the same token, most experienced practitioners know whether their employer will allow them to use public tools to fix their field or alternatively sideline or even terminate them for doing so. Either way, an experienced practitioner can effectively co-opt public lobbying tools to advance the common good — i.e., to repair their field and the country — because every practitioner knows what tools command respect, instill fear, and induce shame in peers. Likewise, every practitioner knows the key foundations of their field to create pressure, e.g., legal safe harbors, enabling legislation, or general word-of-mouth.
An experienced U.S. practitioner who publicly works to repair their field and the country has a great tactical advantage in that they can maximize impact by creatively amplifying their message with the whole array of public tools. Similarly, a practitioner can use their savvy to evaluate initial effectiveness and determine follow-on actions and optimal audiences. Importantly, every field is much wider than a practitioner may initially suppose when considering allied sectors, clients and customers, and vendors such as suppliers, accountants, and counsel, for a start.
As one possible starting point, a practitioner in any regulated U.S. field — most U.S. fields are subject to at least some federal or state regulation — can post an unexpungible, tell-all document on a regulatory site. How? By responding to a regulatory request for public input with a submission that both airs industry dirty laundry and directly addresses regulator questions with impeccable analyses, clear remedies, and conclusive rebuttal of opposing views. Indeed, most regulators post the entirety of an electronic submission immediately and maintain the posting for perpetuity. And no regulator can censor any part of a response merely because it discomfits others.
Moreover, pertinent U.S. law such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) obligates a regulator to publicly and explicitly address each good-faith remedy proposal in several parts of subsequent regulation. First, the regulator must summarize each proposal and then identify the response, respondent, and response site. Crucially, the regulator must also provide explicit rationale as to why a final regulation incorporates or excludes each remedy proposal. Having the rationale can be a godsend where a regulator rejects a proposal because the rationale can provide a practitioner with grounds to contest the rejection, for example by filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to ascertain rationale veracity. A public submission also constitutes actionable evidence of regulator adherence to or violation of the APA or other governing statute.
An exemplary tell-all response is a great roll-out tool to generate media attention, enlist allies, agitate bad actors, and agitate them some more by delivering media reporting to offending entities, industry groups, peers, more regulators, academicians, and others who ostensibly value good practice.
Collectively, the public promotion and private agitation will generate a bonanza of actionable information to incorporate into follow-on public work such as:
I concluded soon after leaving Moody’s that I could most effectively advance my work by always speaking for attribution, including in closed-door meetings that were otherwise private, and by never communicating off-the-record or relying on personal networks. From there, I perceived that I must create irrefutable language to advance my goals — ergo flip-clause-swap-contract — and reject lazy industry lingo such as “hedge” that intentionally obscures through vagueness.
I also learned that I could effectively place my work in front of people who should — but may not want to — know about it by leveraging social media and email. For instance, I often dial-up the pressure by requesting on-the-record-response to on-the-record questions posed in joint emails to companies, U.S. and non-U.S. regulators, industry groups, fellow-practitioners, academicians, and journalists. The practice is win-win in soliciting either deafening silence or at best weak response, both of which constitute useful information to critique and publicize.
Similarly, I have cold-called law enforcement to provide information in ongoing investigations and to assess adherence to consequent settlements. And, although not an attorney, I single-handedly produced and successfully submitted a proposed amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit regarding the ultimate Lehman Brothers litigation of the flip-clause-swap-contract.
My 100%-public approach produced two highly satisfying and productive work affiliations. I worked as a byline journalist covering the flip-clause-swap-contract and other complex-finance while regulators implemented best-practice rules in 2015-2016. And when the first Trump Administration jeopardized the same rules, I resigned as byline journalist to defend the rules and soon after affiliated as Senior Fellow at Croatan Institute, where colleagues’ support helped me exponentially in building-out my workstream. Among recent projects is a book proposal detailing the themes here — namely my self-funded, private-citizen work to fix my field and the crying need for other experienced U.S. practitioners in all fields to do the same.
July 4, 2026, will mark the 250th anniversary of courageous Americans marshaling an open-ended public response to externally driven, existential emergency. Victoriously resolving that emergency eight years later September 3, 1783, the Treaty of Paris immediately birthed an ongoing, internal challenge — namely, how to build and rebuild the United States of America — that itself spawns periodic existential emergencies such as ones that we face now.
Look around. Do you contribute to the ongoing work of building and rebuilding our country? Is the U.S. a happy, thriving country at peace with itself? How does your field contribute to today’s conditions and how will it contribute to tomorrow’s? What values do you espouse and which of those values do you live? Are you committed to doing your best to repair your field to benefit everyone in the U.S. and the country as a whole? Or are you okay with enabling your field to perpetuate injury as long as you are fine, whichever way the wind may blow?
Take this moment to determine what role you will play in the building and rebuilding of this nation. If you are able, I encourage you to take your talents and contribute towards fixing your field through a pathway of public advocacy. I believe you will find great satisfaction as I have.
I am deeply grateful to my Croatan Institute colleagues present, past, and future for encouraging me to perfect my life’s work and for inspiring me with their wonderful examples.

Bill Harrington shows how one can successfully shut-down bad actors and effect policy change that benefits the financial sectors and society.

Senior Fellow Bill Harrington describes a major win in advocating for better finance that will at least slow, and might permanently block, contract revival in the U.S. This win obligates Moody’s Investors Service to publicly scrap a deficient ESG proposal and, in its place, post Bill’s advocacy work.

Senior Fellow Bill Harrington’s Croatan View on IOSCO and how its members must not direct ESG analytics providers on how to govern themselves.